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Worker and Firm Determinants of Piece Rate Variation in an Agricultural Labor Market
Constance Newman and Lovell Jarvis
Introduction
Most rural labor market studies focus on jobs that pay wages, yet a significant proportion of agricultural
laborers in developing countries are paid a piece rate, i.e., a fixed amount per unit of output.  This paper
analyzes piece rate work and particularly, the reasons for the surprisingly large differences that we identified in
the piece rates being paid by different firms for the same tasks in table grape packing plants in Chile.
Piece rates have been the focus of several important theoretical studies, nearly all of which have focused
on the implications of piece rate use for incentives, productivity, and labor costs.
1  Such studies have suggested
that a piece rate is used mainly to increase worker incentives and to eliminate the uncertainty about worker
effort that employers face when paying a wage.  In general, piece rates are expected to increase effort and
output per worker and facilitate the incorporation of a more heterogeneous labor force.  If output can be clearly
measured, piece rates are considered simpler and more efficient than wages.
2  While employers need to monitor
for quality control when piece rates are used, it is generally believed that employers do not need to monitor
effort, nor do they need to screen workers, since workers are paid only for what they produce.
3  By improving
incentives, piece rates may increase income for those who decide to work at piece rate, while simultaneously
reducing employer unit labor costs.  Since pay is dependent on what is actually produced rather than on time
spent—implying greater income uncertainty, workers are thought to require a small increase in the average
expected pay per time spent when working at piece rate instead of at a wage.
4
Few empirical studies have tested piece rate theories.  Important exceptions include Foster and
Rosenzweig (1994, 1996), Lazear (1996), and Seiler (1984), each of which found that worker productivity
increased when a piece rate was used instead of a wage.  We have not found any studies of piece rate
                                                          
1  Important papers that examine the relationship between piece rates and productivity include Stiglitz (1975), Lazear (1990), Pencavel
(1977), Mangum (1962), and Gibbons (1987).
2 "Piec  e   rate  s simply relate   pay to output, s  o the   ques  tion of monitoring is les  s important,"  Polac  hek a  nd Sie  be  rt (1993).
3  For e  xample  , piece rates are seen as a solution to the problems of adverse selection and worker shirking in the efficiency wage
literature (Goldin (1986) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990)).
4 See Pencavel (1977).3
differentials.
In January-March, 1992, we undertook a survey of workers and managers in Chilean table grape
processing sheds.  We found that the piece rates paid for the same task varied by up to 100% among firms
located within two relatively small areas and even more across the three regions studied.  Among the firms
surveyed in the two main areas, piece rates varied from 35 to 77 pesos for the workers who cleaned and
trimmed the grape bunches and from 14 to 29 pesos per box for the workers who packed grapes.  See Table 1.
The large variation in piece rates suggested either that the market was not working efficiently or that
some unexpected economic function was being performed by piece rate differentiation.  Since the piece rate
differences across firms were so large and the labor market seemed so competitive, the latter view seemed the
more plausible.  Chilean unemployment was only 5.6% in 1992 and competition for workers was intense in fruit
producing regions during the harvest season.  Processing sheds were numerous within even a fairly small fruit-
producing area, making it difficult for employers to collude in setting piece rates.  Chilean law prohibited
unions for and strikes by temporary workers, and there were virtually no laws restricting temporary contracts.
The evidence of large piece rate differentials called to mind the substantial literature on wage
differentials.  That literature attempts to explain why firms across and within industries pay different wages to
workers having the same observable human capital characteristics (e.g., Willis 1986, Dickens   and Katz 1987,
Gr  os  hen 1991, Krueger and S  ummer  s 1998, Shaf  fner 1994, Abow  d et al. 1993 and 1994, Brow  n 1980, Rosen
1986).  Plausible reasons as to why wage differentials exist include systematic differences in the unobservable
human capital characteristics of firms' workers, differences in other firm attributes and other explanations such
as the use of an efficiency wage.  Although evidence has been found to support many of these reasons, most
empirical studies have found that large parts of the observed wage differentials are still not well explained by
the available data (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989; Krueger and Summers, 1989).
We find that similar reasons to those mentioned in the wage differential literature help explain observed
piece rate differentials, but other factors peculiar to the use of piece rates are also important.  Firms with higher
levels of fringe benefits or other attributes that are valued by workers pay lower piece rates.  The resulting piece
rate reduction, multiplied by a worker's output, is analogous to a compensating wage differential.  However,4
firms whose superior technology and management allow their workers to achieve higher productivity pay lower,
not higher piece rates.  Workers expect to earn their opportunity cost.  Since workers' earnings are the product
of the piece rate and their productivity, the firm should pay a lower piece rate if the firm's attributes are
responsible for the higher productivity.  This piece rate differential has no analogous wage differential.  Finally,
workers whose superior skills allow them to achieve higher productivity receive higher piece rates.
Accordingly, firms that select a labor force with higher skills will pay a higher piece rate (or the firm will hire
workers with a range of skills and internally differentiate piece rates).  The magnitude of this piece rate
differential depends on the firm's savings when fewer, more productive workers are hired.
Our analysis suggests that piece rate variation plays an economic function, that of allowing
heterogeneous workers to be efficiently allocated among heterogeneous firms.  Our empirical results provide
tentative support for this hypothesis and, accordingly, for a variation of the theory of equalizing differences
(Brown 1980, Rosen 1986).  We find that a fairly large number of factors affect piece rates in the Chilean case
studied.  Given the apparent ability of firms and workers to acquire and utilize information about each other's
characteristics, our empirical results also suggest that the operation of rural labor markets in developing
countries can be surprisingly complex.  Moreover, we are able to explain a larger part of the observed piece rate
differentials than analogous models have been able to achieve for wage differentials.  We believe this success is
largely due to the micro-economic detail of the data set, including our ability to directly link firms and workers.
The Data
From January to March 1992, data were collected from 56 processing sheds and 690 workers in three
separate table grape growing regions of Chile.  Three regions were chosen to ensure coverage of the most
important, yet distinct, production zones: Santa Maria, Buin/Paine, and Lontue.
5  As some firms were not in full
operation and/or were paying wages on the day they were surveyed, the sample for this analysis was reduced to
42 firms and 411 workers.
                                                          
5  Santa Maria is in the   A  conc  a  gua V  alle  y a  bout 160 km. north of Santia  go. B  uin/Paine   and Lontue   a  re   in the Ce  ntral Va  lle  y about 60 km
a  nd 300 km, res  pec  tively, south of Santia  go. In Sa  nta   M  a  ria a  nd in B  uin, we   s  a  mple  d e  ve  ry proce  ss  ing s  hed that c  ould be ide  ntified
w  ithin a  n a  pproximate  ly 30 km. squa  re re  gion.  In Lontue  , we   could inte  rvie  w   only four proc  es  sing she  ds   be  ca  us  e   of time c  onstraints  . In
Santa   Ma  ria  , of 27 proc  es  s  ing s  he  ds   surve  ye  d, nine   we  re   pa  ying a daily wa  ge   and/or we  re una  ble to provide   all of the   data   reques  te  d,
reduc  ing the sa  mple for the ana  lysis   of pie  ce   ra  te  s   to 18 firms   for tha  t re  gion.  In B  uin, of 26 proc  es  sing she  ds   s  urveye  d, four w  e  re 5
The data s  et featured a number   of   r  are qualities  .  Most studies of wage differentials have been forced to
pool workers from different occupations and industries and to use dummy variables to explain observed wage
differentials, but we were able to compare workers in exactly the same task.  Each worker was matched to her
employer, allowing direct linking of plant and worker characteristics in the analysis.  We also obtained
information regarding worker and manager preferences and/or attitudes toward many work-related phenomena,
and worker output for the three days prior to the survey, providing a measure of productivity and firm output.
Data on the availability of fringe benefits and workers’ evaluations of such benefits also permitted analysis of
certain non-wage pecuniary components (Rosen 1986).
Chilean Table Grape Processing Sheds
Sheds processed grapes for export.  Grapes were picked throughout the day, then fumigated, cooled and
carried to the processing sheds.  There the grapes were delivered to piece rate workers (limpiadoras or
“cleaners”) who sequentially sorted the grapes according to variety, color and size and then cleaned them.
Cleaning involved inspecting each bunch and, using small scissors, removing grapes that were damaged or
diseased and pruning to improve their appearance.  When sufficient grapes had been cleaned to fill a box (by
weight),
6 the cleaner sent it forward for weighing and inspection.  If the box passed inspection, the grapes were
delivered to another piece rate worker (embaladora or “packer”) who wrapped the individual bunches in paper
and placed them in a standard export box.  The cleaners and packers were often the only ones in the sheds paid
a piece rate; they were almost always women (99% in our sample); and they comprised about two thirds of total
shed workers.  The remaining workers, those who nailed shut the boxes, stacked the pallets, drove fork-lifts,
supervised piece rate workers, weighed labeled, and moved boxes, plus managers and clerical staff, were paid a
wage.
Grape picking began in the morning, but grapes did not begin to arrive at the processing sheds until
early afternoon.  Processing sheds began work at 2:00 p.m. and continued until all of the grapes picked that day
had been packed.  On average, cleaners worked 9.6 hours per day and packers 10.3 hours, not counting time
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
droppe  d from the   s  ample   for the   s  ame   rea  s  ons, and in Lontue  , of 4, 1 wa  s droppe  d.
6  Because firms utilized two box sizes, 5 kg and 8.2 kg, in accordance with the requirements of different export markets, we6
spent for coffee breaks and dinner.  Workers commonly finished work well after midnight and, during the
seasonal peak, as late as 6:00 a.m.
Processing sheds and their work forces were surprisingly heterogeneous.  We suspect this heterogeneity
is at least partly due to the industry’s rapid growth in the period 1974-1989, resulting in a packing sector
composed of firms of different vintage.  Most of the early sheds were very large, operated by export firms that
packed grapes for a number of different fruit producers.  The export firms and their shareholders usually owned
some grape orchards and their grapes were processed in the same plants, though the firms mainly packed for
others.  Because exporting grapes was highly profitable, many middle-sized growers then began to process their
own grapes.  This allowed them to export their output directly and gave them greater control over processing,
which could strongly influence grape condition and thereby the export price.  Some small growers later
developed processing sheds, usually processing for others via a sub-contract with an export firm.
As shown in Table 2a, the firms differed significantly by size, years of experience, length of operating
season, and technology.  Years of operation varied from one to thirty years and the number of days of operated
in 1991 varied from 20 days to 151 days.  The largest firm could process twenty times more than the smallest
firm could in terms of daily production capacity.
7  The variation in each of these characteristics was highly
similar in the two areas for which a large sample of firms was available, i.e. the areas around Santa Maria and
around Buin/Paine.
8  The mean characteristics of firms’ labor forces also varied greatly, suggesting that
different sheds had access to different labor pools and/or preferred different types of workers.  See Table 2b.
Some sheds had a very young labor force while others had a relatively mature labor force.  In some sheds,
workers were predominantly single; in others predominantly married.  Mean schooling and mean industry
experience, as well as mean worker productivity, varied greatly.
9
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
converted all piece rates to an 8.2 kg box standard on the basis of pesos paid per kg.
7  Most plants were fairly small: in 1991, 19 of 42 packed fewer than 50,000 boxes and another 9 firms packed less than 100,000
boxes.  The 6 largest plants packed 280,000 to 800,000 boxes in 1991, 57% of the grapes processed by the 42 plants in the sample.
8  Statistics for the three Lontue firms are not shown here.
9  Cleaners and packers averaged earnings of 2,800 pesos and 3,800 pesos per day, respectively, or about $8 and $11, using an
exchange rate of 350 pesos per $1.  The expected seasonal earnings for cleaners and packers were $507 and $716, respectively.  The
coefficients of variation of cleaner and packer seasonal earnings were both high, about 0.65, indicating a wide dispersion in
productivity and in the number of days worked.  For comparison, the standard annual wage in 1992 for a permanent male agricultural
worker was about $1,300.7
Hypothesized Determinants of Piece Rates and Econometric Results
We estimated a single equation of piece rate determination that includes supply and demand
characteristics affecting the observed piece rate.
10  The use of ordinary least squares introduces a potentially
serious problem of bias, as a few of the independent variables can be considered endogenous.  In the most
evident cases, we do not have sufficient information to give confidence to the use of instrumental variables or
other simultaneous equation estimators.  Since the ordinary least squares estimates are conditional on the values
of the independent variables, the results presented must be taken as suggestive in terms of explaining the
phenomenon of piece rate variation.
Effects of compliance with tax and social security contributions
Firms were legally required to withhold 20% of each worker’s gross income to pay income taxes and
mandatory social security contributions and medical insurance.  Approximately seventy percent of firms
complied with the law.  That some firms did not comply was a potential source of piece rate variation because
firms that did not withhold faced a lower cost of paying a given net piece rate.  Most workers did not want firms
to withhold any earnings, clearly not caring about taxes and usually preferring a higher cash income to uncertain
future health or social security benefits.
We faced the is  s  ue of   compliance by cons  tructing three dif  fer  ent ver  sions   of   the dependent variable f  or 
each of the two piece r  ate tas  ks, cleaning and packing.  S  ee Table 3.  The f  ir  st dependent variable w  as   the piece
r  ate that f  ir  ms   paid, including taxes and contributions  , if any.  The s  econd and thir  d dependent var  iables   w  er  e two
dif  fer  ent calculations of   the piece rates   that w  or  ker  s r  eceived.
11  The second dependent var  iable ass  umed that
w  or  ker  s did not value taxes paid on their   behalf  , but did value w  ithheld contr  ibutions   f  or   social secur  ity and health
benef  its  , albeit at a dis  counted rate.
12  The thir  d dependent var  iable as  sumed that w  orker  s   placed no value on
                                                          
10  The piece rate equation also takes the form of a hedonic price model in which the implicit prices of job attributes are estimated.
Wage differentials have been estimated using hedonic models in several papers.  Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict (1992) estimate
what they term a "hedonic price equation" (HPE) for a market wage-pension tradeoff, and they follow the work of Ehrenberg and
Smith (1985) in proposing an HPE function related to the Mincer earnings equation.  The HPE represents an equilibrium locus of
piece rates (in this case) associated with different levels of job attributes.
11  Piece rates paid less contributions withheld, if any, equal piece rates received when workers place no value on contributions.  If
workers value contributions to some degree, the value that workers place on withheld contributions is imputed to the workers’ piece
rate.
12  To form the   s  ec  ond va  riable, re  porte  d gross   piec  e rates   we  re   re  duc  ed by 20% whene  ve  r a   pla  nt withheld taxe  s and c  ontributions  .  This8
either   the taxes   or the s  ocial secur  ity and health contr  ibutions w  ithheld on their behalf.  Somewhat surprisingly,
the piece rate paid by firms showed the least variation.
U  se of   dif  f  er  ent ver  s  ions   of   the dependent var  iable produced highly similar   econometr  ic res  ults  .  We
theref  or  e r  epor  t the results   f  r  om only tw  o of   the dependent var  iable f  ormulations  , one f  or   firm cost and another for 
w  or  ker   r  eceipts  , that f  or   which w  e ass  ume w  or  ker  s value social secur  ity contributions   at a discounted r  ate.  The
piece rate at f  irm cost w  as denoted PRPF   for packer  s and P  RCF   f  or   cleaner  s, and the piece r  ate r  eceived by
w  or  ker  s was   P  RP  W12 and PRCW12 f  or   packer  s   and cleaner  s, respectively.  Independent var  iables ar  e def  ined in
Table 4.
The es  timated equations   ar  e shown in Tables   5a and 5b.  We s  how   tw  o var  iations   of   each equation.  In the
f  ir  st, w  e included all of   the var  iables that w  e thought relevant.  I  n the s  econd specification, we excluded mos  t of 
the variables   f  r  om the fir  st s  pecif  ication that had not been significant in that regr  ess  ion.  The signs   and gener  al
magnitudes   of   near  ly all of the var  iables   w  er  e r  obust to dif  f  er  ent s  pecif  ications  .  The number of degrees of
freedom was relatively small, 42 observations, less 14 to 23 independent variables, yielding 19 to 28 degrees of
freedom, but the F test for each equation was highly significant.  N  early all of   the estimated coefficients had the
expected sign and most coefficients were significant, especially in the truncated regressions. Each of the main
hypotheses advanced to explain piece rate variation was supported by the coefficient on at least one independent
variable.  Since most of the variability in piece rates was explained by variables that represented either explicit
or implicit negotiation and/or choices between sheds and workers, the results provide evidence that this labor
market involving temporary, primarily female, rural workers was complex and sophisticated.
Tax Compliance
Firms that withheld taxes and contributions paid higher piece rates as expected.  The coefficient on
TAX, a dummy var  iable equal to 1 if   the f  ir  m deducted taxes, was always positive and always significant in the
packer piece rate equations.  It was significant in the cleaner piece rate equation for the piece rate at firm cost.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
a  djus  tme  nt implicitly a  ss  ume  d tha  t w  orke  rs attributed no value to future soc  ia  l s  ec  urity a  nd he  a  lth benefits   or to having paid taxe  s.  If the 
firm w  ithhe  ld no taxe  s or contributions, the net piec  e rate w  as   include  d in the s  erie  s   w  ithout a  djus  tme  nt.  To form the third va  ria  ble,  the 
gross   piec  e   rate   w  as   re  duc  ed by 12% when firms   w  ithhe  ld no ta  xe  s or contributions  .  This   a  djustment a  ss  ume  d tha  t worke  rs   attribute  d no
value   to ha  ving pa  id ta  xe  s  , but tha  t the  y valued future   socia  l se  c  urity a  nd he  alth be  nefits   a  t 80% of firm c  os  t.9
The estimated coefficients suggest that withholding firms paid piece rates that were about 15% higher, and
workers in those firms received piece rates that were about 10% higher, including the imputation of their social
security and medical contributions at about 80% of their nominal amount.  Given that these contributions
amounted to about 10% of actual pay, it appears that worker cash receipts were essentially the same across
plants, irrespective of whether they paid taxes.   Plants that withheld taxes thus operated at a competitive
disadvantage.
Location Factors and Firm Size
The three areas surveyed had different population densities and faced different agricultural and non-
agricultural employment opportunities.  The area around Buin is closest to Santiago and because of the range of
competing commercial, construction, and industrial jobs, we expected that piece rates would be highest in this
region.  The area around Santa Maria has more grape orchards and is closer to Santiago than is Lontue; thus
Santa Maria was expected to have the second highest piece rates among the three areas.  These expectations
were only partly upheld.  Sheds located in the Buin region (REG2) paid higher piece rates for cleaners relative
to the Santa Maria region, but lower piece rates for packers. The results suggest that packers and cleaners were
more differentiated by skills than expected, so that their incomes could vary in different directions across
regions.  Sheds located in the Lontue region (REG3) paid lower piece rates for packers, as expected.  The
estimated coefficient for cleaners in this region also had a negative sign, but was statistically insignificant.
We expected that larger sheds would pay higher piece rates because larger firm size implies a relative
labor scarcity and larger firms are usually observed to pay higher wages (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989).
Somewhat surprisingly, the simple correlation between piece rates and plant size was negative, but it turned out
that this was because large plants were located close to urban areas where the supply of labor was greater.  The
location of a processing shed required a balance between placing the shed closer to a larger labor pool and
placing it closer to a larger source of grapes.  It was costly to induce workers to travel longer distances to work,
but also costly to transport grapes longer distances.  Sheds built to pack a given grower’s production were
inevitably located on that grower’s farm.  Sheds that were designed to process a large amount of grapes were10
invariably located close to a large labor pool, i.e. a town.  F  ir  m s  ize w  as   meas  ur  ed us  ing the fir  m’  s own
declar  ation of its   maximum daily pr  ocess  ing capacity (M  A  XBOX  )  .  The coefficients on MAXBOX were always
positive and significant in the equation for packers, though not in the equation for cleaners.  These coefficients
again suggested that packing was a more specialized task, requiring greater responsibility.  Packing skills were
presumably in scarcer supply than cleaning skills.
Sheds that were located farther from a reasonably-sized labor pool were also expected to pay higher
piece rates as a result of having to attract workers from a greater distance to fill their employment needs.  We
also anticipated that the predominantly female piece rate workers would be concerned for their safety at night
since many indicated that they walked home from work, and many also declared that they wanted to be able to
deal with any household emergencies that arose.  These concerns were expected to make firm proximity to the
worker’s home an unusually attractive job characteristic.  In fact, workers traveled more than we expected.  We
asked workers   how far   they traveled, how  , and how much time this travel r  equir  ed.  The mean of the mean
distance traveled by shed workers was 6.2 km. (3.7 miles); the median was 5.6 km.  Of individual workers, 75%
traveled more than 7.8 km.  Nonetheless, the coef  f  icient on AV  DI  S  T, the mean dis  tance traveled by a firm’  s
w  or  ker  s, w  as alw  ays pos  itive and str  ongly s  ignif  icant f  or   both w  orker   types  , cleaner  s   and packers  .
13  The result is 
not easy to interpret.  I  t could be that firms   are compens  ating w  orker  s   f  or   tr  aveling a gr  eater   distance and/or   that, if 
piece rates   are higher for   other reasons  , w  or  ker  s w  ill travel f  ar  ther to obtain them.  Regardles  s, the res  ult s  uppor  ts 
the ar  gument that the equilibr  ium piece r  ate involves   a tr  adeof  f between dis  tance and earnings.  A   more elabor  ate
model is   needed to s  ort out the r  elative ef  fects  .
14
Length of Season
Discussions with firm managers and with piece rate workers indicated that the piece rate is essentially
fixed for the whole season.
15  Since women in Chile’s rural regions have relatively few employment
                                                          
13 We observed very few migrant workers.
14 Although paying higher piece rates was one way to attract workers from a longer distance, most firms also provided transportation
for their workers.  Thus, a firm could balance the costs of providing transportation for the marginal worker versus that of increasing
the piece rate.
15 Firms and workers that were interviewed at the end of our survey period provided information on the piece rate as if it were the
piece rate that had prevailed throughout the season.  In several plants we were able to obtain complete plant records and in each of
these the piece rate was the same throughout the season.  In most plants, firms shifted to a daily wage if grapes were of unusually poor11
opportunities during the off-season and wages fall dramatically, by about 50%, when the summer harvest
season ends (Jarvis and Newman, unpublished), workers should prefer jobs in firms that have longer operating
seasons.  Analogous to the theory of equalizing wage differences (Rosen 1986), we expected that the length of
the firm’s processing season and the piece rate it paid would be negatively associated.  The expected length of
s  eason w  as   meas  ured by the actual length of   the pr  evious   s  eas  on w  orked in 1991 (  S  EA  SO  N  ), w  hich w  as   clos  ely
cor  related with manager  s’   declared expectations regar  ding the 1992 s  eas  on.  The coefficient on SEASON was
negative and significant in each regression, as hypothesized, indicating that workers were willing to work for a
lower piece rate during the peak season if they had a reasonable expectation that a shed would offer them more
total employment during the season.
The coefficients on SEASON have interesting implications regarding the implicit marginal wage
cleaners and packers were willing to accept at the end of the packing season.  Let expected total seasonal
income for the average worker be Y = pqD, where D is the number of days of expected work.  Differentiating
seasonal income with respect to days worked yields dY/dD = pq + dP/dD(qD), assuming no change in
productivity as the season lengthens.  The first term is the expected income from working one additional day
and the second term is the reduction in income over the previous period worked from accepting a lower piece
rate to get that extra day of work.  Taking the average of the estimated coefficients on SEASON as dP/dD, it
appears that cleaners and packers were willing to accept a piece rate reduction of 0.16 pesos and 0.115 pesos,
respectively, for each extra day of expected packing shed work.  The average shed operated for 73 days and the
average cleaner and packer earned 2,787 and 3782 pesos, respectively throughout the season, including the 73rd
day. Evaluating dY/dD at the point of means, we estimate that the average cleaner and packer was willing to
accept a net income of 2172 pesos and 2148 pesos, respectively, to be able to work a 74th day.  See Table 6.
Implicitly, cleaners and packers were willing to accept an income for the 74
th day that was 22 percent and 43
percent lower, respectively, relative to the income earned on the 73
rd day.
Although the results suggest that packers were willing to accept a larger absolute and percentage
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
quality or in short supply.   We heard of a few cases where the rate had been increased as the result of a work stoppage.  In at least one
case, the rate decreased when conditions returned to normal. Varying the piece rate over the course of the season either in keeping12
discount than cleaners, the expected net incomes obtained by the two types of workers on the 74th day were
similar, 2,171 pesos and 2,148 pesos, respectively.  This similarity seems plausible since the two types of
workers faced similar opportunity costs in the off season when only jobs requiring few skills were available.
The specification used also indicates that workers were willing to accept a progressively smaller net
daily income as the season extended.  The magnitudes remained reasonable in terms of the large drop off in
expected wages for these workers during the off season.
16  The magnitudes were also consistent with qualitative
responses received during our survey regarding job preferences.  Workers were asked their preference regarding
three mutually exclusive employment contracts for the year: 1) three months at 100,000 pesos per month; 2) six
months at 60,000 pesos per month; or 3) 12 months at 35,000 pesos per month. A longer hypothetical contract
offered higher total annual income, but a significant decline in the marginal wage.  Nonetheless, longer
contracts were preferred by most workers: 48% preferred twelve months at 35,000 pesos, 27% preferred six
months at 60,000 pesos, and only 25% preferred three months at 100,000 pesos.  Many who wanted a longer
contract indicated they had a severe need for additional income.  Some also indicated that saving money during
the processing season to finance expenditures later in the year was difficult due to their limited access to
financial institutions and to requests from friends and relatives for loans and assistance.  Many who preferred
the shorter contracts were women who, usually for family or educational reasons, did not want to work the
entire year anyway.
Our results underscore the strong desire on the part of most female temporary laborers to obtain
employment for longer periods of time.  Workers consistently indicated that they had been attracted to the labor
force by the high wages available in table grape packing jobs, but had then decided that they wanted additional
work.  Many eagerly sought permanent employment, though little of this was available in rural areas.  This
finding is at odds with the assertion of some observers that most temporary female workers in Chile do not want
permanent work.  The finding has importance for packing plant employers who wish to maintain a skilled and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
with external labor conditions or changing product prices would have been costly to negotiate and potentially disruptive to labor
relations.
16  The longest season of any plant was 118 days. The marginal wages for cleaners and packers for the 118th day was estimated to be
1,448 pesos and 228 pesos, respectively.  From other work, we estimate that the actual wage in the off-season, holding constant a
worker’s human capital, was half that during the packing season.13
reliable work force at reasonable cost.  Several firm managers sought to develop activities that could occupy
their employees in the off-season.  Most, however, were restricted in that there were few opportunities for
establishing profitable agricultural activities during the off-season.
Worker- and firm-controlled productivity-increasing factors
We initially thought that firm piece rates would be positively correlated with average worker
productivity.  However, the estimated coefficient on this variable was insignificant, leading us to wholly rethink
our conceptual framework.  In the new framework, measured worker productivity is the outcome of factors that
are controlled partly by firms and partly by workers.  Each factor owner is entitled to a return to his/her assets.
To the extent that workers possess characteristics that increase productivity, thereby allowing the firm to save
on other costly inputs, firms have an incentive to pay higher piece rates to adequately reward such labor.
However, if firms possess characteristics that increase workers’ productivity, the firm should pay a lower piece
rate to thus reward its own factors of production.
Worker-controlled productivity-increasing factors. We expected that w  or  ker  -controlled productivity-
increasing characteris  tics   would be ass  ociated with higher piece r  ates, although the piece rate literature suggests
that a firm should be indifferent to worker productivity since the firm pays workers the value of their specific
output.  Indeed, one reason commonly given in the economics literature for piece rate use is their facility for
incorporating a heterogeneous labor force.
17  However, if other costs vary directly with the number of piece rate
workers employed, firms will prefer more productive workers and in competition will bid up the piece rate of
such workers until unit processing costs are the same whether firms use low or high productivity workers.  We
explain this in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Packing sheds hired supervisors that ensured that each piece rate worker had the required inputs (e.g.,
grapes, boxes, and scissors) and that her output was inspected and recorded.  Other administrative workers paid
the piece rate worker the correct amount for the work performed and in most plants, forwarded deductions for
taxes and contributions to the appropriate institutions.  Supervisors also dealt with specific problems that
                                                          
17  Worker’s measured productivity varied greatly within processing sheds.  Workers in the 90th percentile consistently processed
about three times as many boxes per day as did workers in the 10th percentile.14
inevitably occurred with a labor force, e.g., absences due to illness or family emergencies, a need for
assistance—like a small loan, and the settlement of grievances with the firm or another worker.  The cost of
supervision and administration was likely to be directly related, perhaps exponentially, to the number of
workers in the plant.  Accordingly, since the total supervisory cost of processing a given amount of grapes rose
as the average inherent skills of a firm’s workers declined, firms had an incentive to attract more productive
piece rate workers by paying a higher piece rate.
By hiring fewer workers of greater skill, firms would also save on per-worker costs that must be paid
regardless of the plant’s or the worker’s productivity on a given day.  Most firms paid a “guaranteed daily
wage” if for example the plant was unable to provide its workers with sufficient grapes that allowed them to
earn this amount via piece rate work.  The guaranteed daily wage was close to the legal minimum wage and
varied little from plant to plant.  The size of the expected cost of maintaining labor when it could not be fully
employed was thus positively correlated with the number of workers employed.  And even in days of average
plant-level production, low-productive workers would be more likely than high-productive workers to earn less
than the daily minimum in piece rate pay, thus entailing a greater cost to the firm.  This again implied an
expected saving to the firm from hiring fewer, more-productive workers rather than more, less-productive
workers.
Firms also probably preferred higher productivity workers as a result of capital costs.  For example, all
firms provided each worker with a physical workstation such as a table and work implements.  Assuming that
each firm provided exactly the same workstation and implements to each worker, total capital cost rose with the
number of workers that a firm employed
In our interviews, firm managers mentioned having a preference for workers that required little
supervision, had good relationships with other workers and with management and were willing to work longer
hours when needed.  Theoretically, each of these worker characteristics, if identifiable, warranted a higher piece
rate, with the premium in each case depending on the firm’s savings in other costs.  If output is produced by
piece rate labor alone, productivity does not affect piece rates.  If other factors are involved and if their use
depends on worker productivity, there is scope for piece rate differentiation.  The premium paid high15
productivity workers depends on the cost of the complementary resources that are saved when high productivity
workers are employed instead of low productivity workers.  Different firms can hire one type of labor and pay
the piece rate that corresponds to this labor, or a firm can hire different types of labor and pay workers of
different ability different piece rates.
18
To measure each firm’  s wor  kers  ’   char  acter  is  tics, w  e used the mean value of those char  acter  istics   f  or   all
s  ampled wor  kers   in the fir  m.  A   quadratic ter  m w  as   intr  oduced f  or   each variable to allow   f  or a non-linear   ef  fect.
19
Age and education (MAGE and MSCH) were observable characteristics though likely to be correlated with
productivity and other desirable worker characteristics. The signs of the estimated coefficients were almost
always positive as expected, but the significance of the coefficients differed by task.  For example, the
coefficient on MAGE was more significant in the equations for cleaners than packers, while the coefficient on
MSCH was significant only in the equations for packers.
20  The quadratic terms were normally significant and
of opposite sign, as expected, implying a decreasing marginal effect of each worker characteristic.  A  s a r  es  ult
of comments   f  rom plant manager  s   that mar  r  ied w  or  ker  s wer  e mor  e matur  e and f  ocused on their   work, w  e included
the mean number   of   marr  ied w  or  ker  s in the labor for  ce (  M  MA  RS  T).  I  ts   estimated coefficient consistently had a
positive and significant effect in the packer piece rate equations, but not in the cleaner equations.  The quadratic
term was never significant.
We als  o included mean total per   capita hous  ehold income fr  om other   w  or  ker  s in the w  or  ker  ’s   hous  ehold
(  MH  HP  C) on the ass  umption that workers   f  r  om poor  er   hous  eholds   w  ould be more highly motivated, in w  hich
cas  e the expected sign on MH  HP  C w  ould be negative.  Instead, the estimated coefficient was significant and
positive in the equation explaining the piece rate received by packers, and was otherwise insignificant.  The
significant result may be spurious, but it could mean that workers from families where income from other
workers was higher tended to earn more because of a greater family work ethic or other family characteristic
                                                          
18 Piece rate equilibrium requires the maximization of firm profits and worker utility.  If there are workers with different productivity
levels and if firms are willing to hire the lower-productivity workers only at a lower piece rate, equilibrium requires that the piece rate
earnings of all employed workers are greater than their opportunity cost.
19 Though the   chara  cteristic  s   of e  ac  h w  orke  r a  re   exoge  nous  , the   me  an chara  cteristic   of a   firm’s worke  rs   is   the re  s  ult of firm and w  orker
c  hoic  e  s and is proba  bly not independent of the   pie  c  e ra  te tha  t is   pa  id.  We   do not ha  ve appropriate ins  trume  nts   for thes  e   variable  s  .
20 In the equation for packers, only the coefficient on MAGE2 is significant and it is positive.  If the marginally significant negative
coefficient on MAGE is considered significant, the net effect of work force mean age is not substantial in this equation. See also Table16
correlated with productivity.
Two experience variables   were us  ed: mean year  s in the piece rate task at w  hich the w  orker   was w  or  king
w  hen inter  viewed, i.e. cleaner   or   packer   (M  EX  P  ERT)  , and mean year  s   w  ith the same firm (M  TEN  URE)  .
21  Mean
task experience (MEXPERT) was rarely significant, but the mean years that a shed’s workers had been
employed with the firm (MTENURE) was always positive and significant, while its quadratic term was negative
and significant.
22  When the tenure variable was omitted from the equation, the experience variable became only
slightly more significant.
A worker’s longer tenure could equally well signal that the worker had been willing to sacrifice income
in order to remain with a firm that she liked, as that the firm was willing to pay more for workers that it valued.
However, the positive sign on MTENURE suggested that tenure was likely to be an indicator of worker skills
that were important in this type of work, such as manual dexterity and speed, ability to concentrate, and
motivation.  These abilities were observable to the employer over time.  Additionally, however, a firm’s
decision to rehire workers was also potentially influenced by the manager’s trust in a worker.  Most managers
expressed concern about wanting to avoid “troublemakers” and having a preference for workers that they
already knew.  The processing sheds were vulnerable to work stoppages for higher piece rates or other
conditions that did occur occasionally, as well as to worker absenteeism, so firms may have been willing to pay
a higher rate to retain trusted workers.  Since both trust and productivity factors were likely to be combined in
TENURE, it is impossible in this model to distinguish their separate effects.
The standard human capital variables had relatively weak effects.  The relatively weak effects could be
caused by our failure to specifically include indicators of worker productivity like manual dexterity, eyesight,
and endurance.  Since these characteristics were not measurable in any practical way for the purposes of this
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
8.
21 Mean years in the industry (MEXPERI) was tried, but it had the same sign as mean years in the task (MEXPERT) and was never
significant.
22 Over the range of actual sample variation, an increase in the average tenure of firm workers was first associated with an increase in
the piece rate and then with a decline. The firm whose workers had the shortest tenure (1.2 years) had an estimated piece rate about
3.5 pesos lower than a firm whose workers had the optimum tenure (4.1 years). However, the firm whose workers that had the longest
tenure (7.3 years) had the lowest piece rate, about 4 pesos lower than a firm with the optimum tenure. Longer average tenure could
reflect a firm’s ability to screen workers and establish conditions that will retain higher productivity workers over time. However, very
long tenure could also indicate that a firm had a largely “captive” labor force because of geographical or institutional reasons.17
study, this represents another potential source of bias.  Not having this kind of information also makes it
impossible to sort out some of the competing labor demand and supply reasons for why TENURE and other
variables are significant.  That said, we believe TENURE helps to capture some of these unobservable
characteristics, making it less likely that we have an important omitted variables problem.  It is more likely that
the relatively weak effects of the observed human capital variables is attributable to the possibility that the
savings that firms achieve by hiring more productive workers is small.  Nonetheless, the regressions show that
firms did pay somewhat higher piece rates when they had a work force with a higher average level of
observable skills or experience.
Moreover, the econometric evidence was reinforced by statements from managers who indicated a
preference for workers that produced more and higher quality output, were more trustworthy, and demonstrated
greater ability to get along with coworkers and management.  Several managers showed us lists that
documented workers’ characteristics and indicated that they used these lists when hiring.  Finally, eight sheds
paid piece rates for cleaners that were internally differentiated by the level of individual worker productivity
and three sheds paid such differentiated rates for packers.
23  This differentiation was explicit confirmation that
worker productivity mattered for these firms.
24  Each of these findings is contrary to the frequent assumption in
the economic literature that worker characteristics do not matter when piece rates are used.
25
Firm-controlled productivity increasing factors.  We expected that firm investments in technology,
improved plant organization, or the ability to process grapes that were in better condition would raise worker
productivity.  Further, so long as workers were aware of firm-influenced productivity differences, such higher
productivity should lead to lower, not higher piece rates.  To the extent that firms possessed improved
technology that allowed their workers to achieve higher productivity or were better organized and could provide
                                                          
23 In these cases, our piece rate series utilizes the base (lowest) piece rate.  A dummy variable, included to test whether the use of
differentiated piece rates affected the base piece rate, was statistically insignificant.
24 Plants that paid differentiated piece rates were larger and had larger fixed costs or offered better fringe benefits. When piece rates
were differentiated, the highest piece rate within a shed averaged about 25% more than the lowest or base piece rate, though one firm
offered a proportionately much higher maximum piece rate.
25  For example, Fuller (1968) states “The typical employment relation in seasonal agriculture is utterly barren.... Since the great
majority of the work is done at piece rates, neither the contractor nor the farmer hires people as individuals, [neither]... is much
concerned whether a hundred boxes of tomatoes are picked by two workers or by ten, so long as they get picked.  In a similar way,
there is little concern whether those who are picking today are the same as those who picked yesterday or last week or last year, so
long as there are enough hands to get today’s job done on time.” (italics in original)18
a constant flow of good quality grapes to workers, allowing workers to process more boxes per time period, the
firm should pay a lower piece rate.  This follows from the assumption that each worker should earn an income
consonant with her opportunity cost in equilibrium.
26  If a firm’s characteristics allow its workers to produce
more output, ceteris paribus, worker competition for the jobs at the firm should cause the piece rate to decline
until its workers’ incomes are equal to what they would earn elsewhere.
As a simple example, assume that the average firm offers the average worker conditions under which
she achieves productivity q
a.  The firm pays piece rate, p
a, so that the worker earns an income y
a  = p
a q
a, which,
in equilibrium, is assumed equal to her opportunity cost, including any required premium for the extra effort
and/or risk inherent in piece rate employment (Stiglitz 1974, Pencavel 1977, Lazear 1990).  If another firm
offers conditions under which an average worker can achieve higher than average productivity, q’ = bq
a, b > 1,
that firm should be able to hire the worker at a piece rate equal to p’ = p
a/b, which again yields an income equal
to y
a.  The firm’s piece rate saving is the incentive given for its productivity-increasing investments.
We tested this hypothesis using several variables.  F  ir  s  t, plant organization was   expected to influence
productivity via the steadines  s   of grape flow   to w  orker  s  .  We used data on the variability in the total number   of 
boxes   of   gr  apes   pr  ocess  ed in the thr  ee days   immediately pr  ior   to our   s  urvey to indicate the f  ir  m’s   ability to
organize a steady flow of   gr  apes to its w  or  ker  s.  V  ar  iability w  as   meas  ured as the r  atio of   the maximum number of
grapes   proces  sed in one day relative to the minimum number   of   grapes   pr  oces  s  ed in one day (  RA  TI  O  P)  .  A high
r  atio, indicating poorer organization, w  as expected to be as  s  ociated w  ith a lower   piece rate, and this was   indeed
the r  esult.  The coefficient on RATIOP was negative and significant in each of the regressions for cleaners and
packers.  Data on the day to day variation in total shed output for only three days of production appears to have
captured a significant aspect of shed operation.
27
                                                          
26 Workers who decide to work in a specific shed should determine that piece rate work provides them with an income that is higher
than they could earn in wage employment and also that, among packing sheds, the shed chosen offers the highest income.
27 There is an important difference between technology or grape condition and plant organization in terms of the tradeoff between the
resulting higher productivity and associated lower piece rate.  Better technology and better grape condition allowed workers to achieve
higher productivity with no greater expenditure of effort than the workers would have expended to achieve a lower productivity in an
average firm.  In contrast, improved plant organization allowed workers to process additional grapes by providing them with a steadier
flow of raw material, avoiding periods with nothing to process, but the provision of more grapes also required workers to make a
greater effort. So long as workers strongly preferred higher income to enforced “rest” while at work, workers should have been willing
to accept a lower piece rate to have a more regular supply of grapes, though the tradeoff should be less than proportional to the19
A  s an alter  native measure of   plant organization, w  e asked manager  s   and workers   how long wor  kers   had
s  tood at their pos  itions each day w  ithout w  or  king f  or   lack of   grapes   and us  ed the mean time r  eported by w  orker  s 
as an alter  native indicator of   the f  low of gr  apes (  WA  IT)  .  The estimated coefficient had the expected sign, but
was significant in only the equation for cleaners.
We also collected data on grape condition (amount of disease and damage) during the three days for
which we obtained productivity data, expecting that grape condition would influence worker productivity.
However, managers could not provide us with an independent index of grape condition and we had to abandon
this variable.
Finally, we developed an index of   f  ir  m technology bas  ed on each f  ir  m’s   us  e of   sever  al technologies   that
w  er  e thought to directly aff  ect w  or  ker   pr  oductivity and/or   demons  trate the f  ir  m’  s   concer  n f  or   achieving higher 
productivity (S  U  MTECH  ).
28  A   higher   index w  as   expected to be as  sociated w  ith low  er piece r  ates.  The
coefficient was always negative and significant in each of the regressions for cleaner piece rate.  It had the
expected sign, but was not significant for packer piece rates.  This is consistent with the fact that these
technologies affect cleaners much more than they affect packers.
Overall, three variables were used to characterize processing firm-controlled productivity-increasing
characteristics.  The coefficients on each of these variables had the expected sign and two were always
significant.  These results supported the hypothesis that firm investments that raised worker output were
reflected in lower, not higher piece rates.  This is an important finding because the expected effect on
productivity from individual firm characteristics could well pose a case where information asymmetry could be
an important barrier to an efficient market.  Workers could easily ascertain the piece rates paid by different
firms, but the effect of firm characteristics on a worker’s productivity should have been harder to predict.  Firms
that had made investments that led to higher worker productivity should have wanted to advertise that
information in order to convince workers that they should accept a lower piece rate, while firms that had not
should have wanted to hide the fact.  The evidence here suggests that workers were both aware of the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
increase in productivity that this permitted.
28 The  se   te  chnologies   include  d a mec  ha  nic  al box dis  tributor to move gra  pe  s   a  long the   proc  es  sing line, an e  lec  trica  l s  ta  ple   gun to ta  ck box20
importance of firm-influenced productivity differences and able to obtain information about what firms actually
provide.  We later discuss possible mechanisms by which this success was achieved.
Firm Services--Fringe Benefits
Most processing sheds provided workers with some combination of fringe benefits that included meals,
snacks, transportation to and from work, child care, interest-free loans, and higher quality bathrooms.  Sheds
also provided different quality work environments in terms of worker treatment by supervisors and managers.
According to the theory of equalizing wage differentials, sheds that provide more and better fringe benefits
and/or a better work environment should pay lower piece rates.  We expected the same would occur for piece
rates.
 29
U  sing workers  ’ evaluations   of the f  r  inge benef  its provided by the firm in w  hich they w  or  ked, w  e created
an index of   f  ringe benefits (FRINGE).
30  A  s expected, the coefficient on FRINGE was always negative and it
was significant in half the regressions.  The partial correlation between the individual fringe benefits and the
piece rates paid was also negative for nearly all of the fringe benefits, with the more expensive benefits such as
lunch, childcare and bathrooms having the strongest negative correlations.  See Table 7.  These results provide
additional empirical support for a theory of piece rate equalizing differences.  Few prior empirical studies have
been able to evaluate the link between fringe benefits and the wages or piece rates paid because of a lack of
appropriate data.
We als  o as  ked w  orker  s   w  hy they had chosen to w  or  k in the s  hed w  her  e they wer  e inter  viewed.  A  lthough
a lar  ge number of reasons   were given, many wor  kers   refer  red to the good w  or  king conditions   of   the plant.  We
utilized the per  centage of   w  or  ker  s in each plant that mentioned good w  orking conditions as   an index of wor  king
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
tops to boxes  , a   c  omputer, a  nd a fa  x mac  hine.
29 Theoretically, a firm notes that workers have a demand for certain amenities that the firm can profitably provide.  When piece rates
are used, a firm “sells” amenities to workers through an implicit reduction in the piece rate.  Because many fringe benefits have a
quasi-public good quality, i.e., bathrooms, firms with a larger number of workers should have a cost advantage over smaller firms in
the provision of such benefits. Similarly, firms that have a longer operating season can defray the costs of fixed assets over a larger
number of boxes of fruit, thus decreasing the piece rate reduction per box.  Finally, workers that have higher total incomes are likely to
have a higher demand for fringe benefits, to the extent that the latter are income elastic.  Cet. par., sheds that provide fringe benefits
will attract workers that place a higher value on such services, irrespective of those workers’ productivity.
30 Services were ranked on a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 assigned when the service was not offered and 1-5 representing the ranking from
“bad” to “good.”  The aggregate index was a weighted sum of each shed’s workers’ mean evaluations of all services. The largest
weights were placed on meals, transportation and bathroom quality (which interviews suggested were very important to most workers)21
conditions   (M  CO  N  D)  .  Though far   f  rom an objective metric of w  or  king conditions  , w  e thought we might f  ind an
inver  s  e relationship with the piece rate if   the compens  ating wage diff  erential ef  fect were strong.
 31
M  CO  ND   was als  o included as   a poss  ible indicator of   the f  air-  w  age eff  or  t hypothes  is put f  or  th by A  kerlof
and Y  ellen (  1990)   w  her  eby w  or  ker  s w  ill w  ithdr  aw   ef  fort if   they think they are not being paid w  hat they cons  ider
to be a fair wage.  Wor  ker  s who do not appr  eciate the w  orking conditions may be les  s w  illing to work hard, and
thus the f  irm w  ould pay them less   (  accor  ding to our   hypothes  is on the piece rate-  pr  oductivity ef  fect)  .
The coefficient on MCOND was consistently positive and significant in the regressions for both types of
piece rates.  The result indicates some evidence for the fair-wage effort hypothesis and rejects the compensating
wage differential argument.  However, this variable has not only the problem of being a poor measure of
objective conditions (and thus a poor indicator for testing the CWD argument), but since the firm should
determine the piece rate taking into account its working conditions, endogeneity is an issue.  We do not see it as
an important effect, but felt it worthwhile mentioning. Including it did not substantially change the estimated
coefficients of other variables.
Facilitation of off-season work
Most workers sought employment in the slack season.  Some firms made a specific effort to provide
their workers with employment during the slack season.  We included a variable for the mean number of days of
off-season employment obtained by a firm’s workers (MOTHEM) in the expectation that a firm’s
ability/willingness to provide such employment could induce workers to accept a lower piece rate during the
packing season.  However, MOTHEM could also be an indicator of unobserved worker quality, with better
workers gaining more work during the year.  If so, these workers should have received a higher piece rate
during the packing season. The coefficient on MOTHEM was positive and significant in the equations for
cleaner piece rates, providing some support for the latter hypothesis.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
and the smallest weight on first aid, which was deemed unimportant by most workers.
31 The appropriate approach would have been to ask workers to evaluate the working conditions of the firm in which they worked.  We
did not, believing that asking such a question, particularly if it directly referred to the firm’s management, might make workers and
management uncomfortable. Having asked workers why they chose to work in the firm, we attempted to adapt their answers to get at
the same issue. Despite the unexpected econometric result, we included it here in order to be forthcoming.  Including it did not
substantially change the estimated coefficients of other variables.  If working conditions are measured inappropriately, or if other
important plant characteristics are not included as independent variables, we may have an omitted variables problem for plant22
Relative impact of independent variables on the piece rate
To assess the impact of each independent variable on the piece rates paid, we multiplied the estimated
coefficient ( i) of each variable by its sample standard error ( i).  The resulting statistic provided an
approximate indicator of the effect of  “equally likely” movements in the different independent variables on the
piece rates paid.
32  We evaluated only variables having a statistically significant coefficient.  Since there was
some variation in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients across equations, we used an average of the
estimated coefficients.  The results (see Tables 8a and 8b) were broadly consistent with our expectations that
stronger effects would come from firm-controlled productivity-increasing factors, location factors, and
equalizing difference factors, with weaker effects from worker-controlled productivity-increasing factors.
For cleaners, the five most important variables included two that reflected location (AVDIST and
REG2), two that reflected firm-controlled productivity-related characteristics (SUMTECH and RATIOP) and
one that reflected annual duration of employment (SEASON).  Fringe benefits, another equalizing difference,
was important in explaining the variation in the piece rates received by workers, but not those paid by firms.
Several variables reflecting observable aspects of worker human capital characteristics had small net effects.
The results for packers were similar with one exception.  Mean per capita income from other family
workers (MHHPC) had by far the largest estimated effect of any variable.  We discount its importance because
this variable was marginally significant in only one equation and its sign changed in the equations for cleaner
piece rates.  The five next most important variables for packers included three that reflected location
(AVEDIST, REG2 and REG3), one that reflected firm-controlled productivity factors (RATIOP) and one that
reflected annual duration of employment (SEASON).  Fringe benefits (FRINGE) and firm size (MAXBOX) had
small effects, as did whether the firm deducted taxes from worker payments (TAX).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
characteristics.
32 We utilize this measure instead of estimated elasticities because the latter say nothing about the variation of the independent variable
within the sample. This approach assumes that movements of one standard deviation are approximately equally likely to occur for all
variables.23
Mechan  is  ms   for D  ealin  g wit  h Im  p  erfect In  f  ormat  ion
The efficient operation of the packing shed labor market depended importantly on the ability of workers
and sheds to obtain reliable information about numerous characteristics of the other which were not easily
observable.  Our econometric results suggest that workers and firms managed to deal fairly effectively with this
problem.  What mechanisms were used?  First, we heard from many workers that they exchanged information
about firms in an informal, but purposeful manner, particularly during the off season.  The seasonal nature of
work allowed workers time to discuss the characteristics of different sheds with close friends and kin, make
decisions about where they would like to work and seek employment in that shed.  Firms usually started
recruiting in October or November, two to three months before the packing season began.  Numerous workers
changed firms from year to year, though changes were instigated by managers as well as by workers.
33
Second, most shed managers knew the characteristics of many potential workers because of previous
employment experience.  Some managers maintained detailed lists enumerating the qualities of past employees.
When additional, unknown workers were required, firms preferred to recruit by word of mouth, asking existing
employees to recruit new workers.  This recruiting approach probably provided managers with better
information about the quality of potential workers and also increased the likelihood that potential workers
would have good knowledge of the particular combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary attributes offered by
the firm.
34   Allowing workers to interact with friends and kin also tended to create a working environment that
the workers valued.
At the beginning of the packing season we were surprised to find that several plants had not established
the piece rate to be paid, although they had been operating more than a week.  Workers in these plants indicated
that they expected the piece rate would be within a given range, but were not greatly concerned.  Managers in
these plants indicated that they still did not have sufficient information about grape prices and labor market
conditions to set the piece rate.  Clearly, managers had some scope to assess the quality of their work force
                                                          
33 Ninety percent of the labor force interviewed had packing shed experience prior to 1992.  Annual turnover varied greatly by firm,
from 20% to 80%.24
before setting the piece rate.  Similarly, that workers began work without fixing the piece rate confirms that
other firm characteristics were important in their choice of shed and that there was some level of understanding
between many workers and management.  Workers did not feel that their employment options were limited.
Most workers interviewed at the beginning of the season indicated that they felt they could quit and
immediately obtain another job.
Several managers indicated that they offered their best packing shed workers off-season employment to
help retain such workers during the packing season.  Such workers should also have obtained information
through such work about the condition of the grapes that they (and others) were to process.  With this
information, they should also have been better able to determine what was an acceptable piece rate in that firm,
and perhaps even to communicate it to other potential workers.
35
C  on  clu  sion  s 
As noted previously, our model suffers from endogeneity issues and perhaps omitted variables.  As we
have no way to correct for these problems with the existing data, caution is warranted when interpreting the
estimated coefficients.  Nonetheless, the qualitative results are theoretically plausible and generally consistent
with impressions that we gained while carrying out the survey regarding how the labor market functioned.  The
r  es  ults show that piece r  ate variation w  as sys  tematically related to w  orker   and employer   char  acter  is  tics and
s  ugges  t that, r  ather   than repr  esenting inef  ficiency, piece r  ate variation played an important economic function of
allowing specific workers to be allocated among specific firms given heterogeneity of both workers and firms.
Labor   and management appeared to pos  sess   significant inf  or  mation about the value of   diff  er  ent types of
f  ir  m and labor characteris  tics  .  Firm work forces varied greatly in terms of mean worker characteristics and these
differences were related systematically to the piece rates paid.  In turn, workers demonstrated a willingness to
work in firms in which the piece rate was low if employment in those firms offered other advantages.  Such
advantages included a longer work season, better technology or organization that enabled workers to achieve
higher productivity, attractive fringe benefits, firm proximity to workers’ homes, and even the offer of illegal,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
34 Recruiting labor in this traditional and somewhat paternalistic way was evidence of a system in which personal ties often played an
important role in the work relationship.  It was unclear whether such ties favored or hindered work efficiency.25
tax-free pay.  Geographic variations in labor supply and demand also affected piece rates.  Overall, analysis of
these labor market transactions suggested a greater complexity and sophistication of operation than is
commonly assumed in most discussions of rural labor markets in developing countries.
Our res  ults explained a lar  ger propor  tion of   the var  iation in obser  ved piece rates   than is generally explained
in r  esear  ch on the var  iation in wages   across   firms.  We s  us  pect this occur  red becaus  e our   micr  o data s  et pr  ovided
information on a gr  eater   number of   linked worker and f  irm char  acter  is  tics than are usually available in such studies.
Although a consider  able amount of the variation in piece rates remains unexplained, the unexplained component
might decline further if additional data were sought on currently “unobservable” worker and firm
characteristics.   
Since the reas  ons   used to explain piece rate diff  erentials are s  imilar to those that have been advanced to
explain w  age diff  er  entials, our results   ar  e broadly relevant to that liter  ature as   w  ell.
Note, however, that the effect of piece rate differentials on worker incomes (and firm cost) is a function of
worker productivity, which is not the case for wages.  If worker productivity varies greatly, as it did in the table
grape packing sheds studied, more productive workers will pay more than less productive workers for a specific
firm benefit when piece rates are used.  Differentiated piece rates can avoid this problem.  If piece rates are not
differentiated, the use of a piece rate deduction to recover the costs of, say, fringe benefits, appears less efficient
and equitable than use of a wage deduction since the value of fringe benefits consumed is not likely to be
strongly correlated with individual worker productivity.  This consequence of piece rate payment could make it
more difficult for firms and workers to “agree” on the exchange of a service for a reduction in the piece rate and
thus impede the provision of such services, relative to industries in which wages are paid.
Piece rate differentials that are explained by differences in firm technology or organization are
particularly interesting in light of the fact that firm factors were traditionally not included in studies of wage
determination.
36  In the last decade, however, an increasing number of empirical wage studies have incorporated
firm characteristics as determinants, often with the goal of trying to understand one aspect of unexplained
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
35  If the grapes were expected to require less work to process, the piece rate should have been reduced.
36 See Groshen (1991) and Willis (1986). Groshen wrote, “Labor supply factors dominate current empirical research on wage26
differences across firms (e.g., differences by size, percent female).  Except for Abowd (1993, 1994), the data
were not sufficiently disaggregated to permit explanation of detailed firm-related differences.  Groshen also
found that even when controlling for human capital, occupation, and industry, significant establishment
differentials remained, and concluded that “these results signal a need for research on whether intra-industry
variations in plant-wide quality of employment (e.g., location, personnel policies, environmental factors) could
explain establishment wage differentials.”  In this paper, we have been able to show that those kinds of specific
firm-related factors are significant determinants of pay.  It is likely that such micro data would also work well in
determining the impact of specific firm factors on wage differences.
Human capital variables have long been known to be important determinants of wages, but they have
been considered irrelevant to the setting of piece rates.  This study shows that not only is the determination of
piece rates highly dependent on market labor supply and demand factors, it is also dependent on the
characteristics of workers.  These piece rate differentials are notable because they were not expected to exist.
That is, although it is widely known that piece rate workers are heterogeneous, it is broadly accepted that
variations in worker “quality” are automatically and fully handled by use of a piece rate.  As shown in this
paper, however, this is only part of the story.  More productive workers have higher average products per unit of
output achieved, not only per unit of time worked, provided that more productive workers save on the use of
complementary factors.  That is, labor’s share of the value added in each unit of output rises as innate worker
productivity rises and this is reflected in a rising piece rate.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
determination even though they explain less than half of observed wage variation.”  Willis points out that human capital factors were
predominant because data on workers was easily available.27
Table 1
Piece Rates Paid Per Firm: All Regions, Santa Maria, and Buin/Paine




39 19.7 4.2 14.4 28.8
Weighted Piece Rate
Limpieza-Gross/Net




19 19.5 4.6 14.5 28.8
Weighted Piece Rate
Limpieza-Gross/Net




18 20.4 3.7 14.4 28.2
Weighted Piece Rate
Limpieza-Gross/Net
18 46.1 8.0 35.9 68.6
Table 2a
Firm Characteristics: All Regions
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Years of operation 42 9.2 5.9 1.0 30.0
Max. no. of boxes processed per day 1991 41 2951 2265 534 11,000
Total packers and cleaners employed in firm 41 49.0 34.7 10.0 185.0
Days in operation/season 1991 42 72.9 26.8 20.0 118.0
No. of boxes processed/season 1991 (‘000) 42 122.3 172.8 10.0 800.0
No. hectares planted to fruit by firm 42 131.3 257.3 0.0 1250.0
If process fruit from other growers 42 0.36 0.5 0.0 1.0
If have a box distributor 42 0.19 0.4 0.0 1.0
If have a computer 42 0.66 0.5 0.0 1.028
Table 2b
Mean Worker Characteristics by Firm








Mean age 42 30.2 4.3 20.8 38.1
Mean schooling 42 8.2 1.2 5.4 10.8
Mean tenure 42 3.3 1.4 1.2 7.3
Mean experience in task 42 5.2 2.3 1.8 10.5
Mean distance traveled to work (km) 42 6.2 5.1 0.6 31.2
Percent married or living with partner 42 0.54 0.2 0.0 0.9
Mean hours/day worked by packers 39 10.3 2.2 7.4 15.9
Mean hours/day worked by cleaners 42 9.6 2.1 6.5 14.6
Mean packer hourly productivity 39 19.2 7.0 9.3 33.3
Mean cleaner hourly productivity 42 5.5 1.8 1.7 9.6
Table 3
Effects of Piece Rate Adjustments on Piece Rate Variation
Piece Rate Adjustment N Mean Standard
Deviation
Minima Maxima
Firm cost: packers 39 19.7 4.2 14.4 28.8
Worker net: packers
(gross PR discounted 12%)
39 18.4 4.3 12.7 28.8
Worker net: packers
(gross PR discounted 20%)
39 17.5 4.5 11.5 28.8
Firm cost: cleaners 42 53.6 11.5 35.0 76.6
Worker net: cleaners
(gross PR discounted 12%)
42 50.1 11.8 30.8 75.2
Worker net: cleaners
(gross PR discounted 20%)
42 47.7 12.5 28.0 75.229
TABLE  4
 Variable  Definition of Variables Used in Regressions
 TAX  Dummy for accounting method (1=If the firm deducts)
 AVDIST  Average distance traveled by workers to firm
 AVTIME  Mean hours worked per day at firm
 MAGE  Mean age of workers in firm
 MAXBOX  Maximum number of boxes processable per day by firm
 MEXPERT  Mean years of experience in task
 MHHPC  Mean per capita household income not including worker income
 MMARST  Proportion of workers in firm that are married
 MOTHEM  Mean days workers are employed during the rest of the year
 MSCH  Mean number of years of schooling
 MTENURE  Mean years of tenure of workers in firm
 MCOND  % of workers in firm who chose firm for working conditions
 MOTHEM  Mean number of days workers employed during the off-season
 PRPF  Weighted packer piece rate (8 kg)—firm cost
 PRPW12  Weighted packer piece rate (8 kg)—worker net (withholding discounted 12%)
 PRCF  Weighted cleaner piece rate (8 kg)-- firm cost
 PRCW12  Weighted cleaner piece rate (8 kg)-- worker net (withholding discounted 12%)
 RATIOP  Ratio of minimum to maximum total grapes processed by day
 REG2  Dummy for Buin-Paine region
 REG3  Dummy for Lontue region
 SEASON  Firm season length in 1991 in days
 FRINGE  Index of services--increasing in quantity and quality
 SUMTECH  Index of firm technology
 WAIT  Average daily time inactive waiting for grapes to process30
TABLE 5a        Cleaner Piece Rates
 Dependent Estimated Coefficients  (with t statstics in parentheses)
 Variables: n=42 PRCF PRCW12 PRCF PRCW12
 TAX 3.85
* (1.69) 0.98 (0.42) 4.23































** (2.35) -1.55 (1.60) -2.07
** (2.10)
 WAIT -0.04
* (1.65) -0.04 (1.49)
 MAGE 7.93
*** (2.73) 3.49 (1.18) 6.65
** (2.19) 3.68 (1.19)
 MAGE2 -0.14
*** (2.96) -0.07 (1.49) -0.11
** (2.20) -0.06 (1.23)
 MSCH 5.27 (0.57) 3.97 (0.42)
 MSCH2 -0.43 (0.76) -0.32 (0.55)












* (1.86) 0.05 (0.02) -2.30 (1.00) 1.01 (0.43)
 MEXPERT2 0.41
** (1.97) 0.07 (0.33) 0.21 (1.05) -0.04 (0.21)
 MHHPC x10 -0.03 (0.72) -0.05 (1.14)
FRINGE -1.05 (0.34) -3.06 (0.96) -2.53 (0.96) -4.97
* (1.84)
MCOND 13.22
** (2.06) 5.58 (0.86) 11.10
* (1.83) 6.79 (1.10)
CONSTANT -66.25 (1.12) -8.02 (0.13) -53.91 (1.16) -16.21 (0.34)
R
2 .81 .82 .78 .78
R
2  adjusted .60 .61 .63 .64
F Stat & Critical
Value at 1%
F(22,19) = 8.38 > 2.86 F(22,19) = 8.60 > 2.86 F(16,25) = 9.05 > 3.18 F(16.25) = 9.31 > 3.18
* Significant at a = .10.           
** Significant at a = .05.          
*** Significant at a = .0131
TABLE 5b     Packer Piece Rates
 Dependent   Estimated Coefficients  (with t statistics in parentheses)







































 SUMTECH -0.31 (0.50) -0.28 (0.46)
 WAIT 0.01 (0.89) 0.01 (1.17)
 MAGE -0.70 (0.57) -2.02 (1.62)
 MAGE2 0.01 (0.66) 0.04
* (1.80)
 MSCH 10.56 (1.70) 16.88
*** (2.72) 6.63 (1.21) 10.12
* (1.85)
 MSCH2 -0.62 (0.17) -1.00

















 EXPERT -1.68 (1.59) -0.18 (0.17)
 EXPERT2 0.09 (0.91) -0.03 (0.35)




*** (2.77) -1.57 (1.34) -2.02
* (1.74)
 MCOND 6.77
** (2.23) 2.34 (0.77) 7.65
*** (2.84) 4.79
* (1.78)
 CONSTANT -11.42 (0.37) -23.27 (0.76) -8.77 (0.38) -21.50 (0.94)
R
2 .77 .78 .70 .71
R
2  adjusted .45 .47 .52 .54
F Stat & Critical
Value at 1%
 F(22,16) = 5.89 > 2.95 F(22,16) = 6.23 > 2.95 F(14,24) = 6.36 > 2.94 F(14,24) =  6.78 >
2.94
* Significant at a = .05.         
** Significant at a = .10.        
*** Significant at a = .0132
Table 6












pq|D=73 dp/dD pq|D=74 dY/dD|D=73
Cleaners 53.6 52 73 2787 -0.160 2779 2172
Packers 19.7 192 73 3782 -0.115 3760 2148
Table 7
Mean Worker Evaluation of Firm Fringe Benefits




Lunch 32 2.9 1.28 -0.90 -0.01
Snack 249 3.4 0.94 0.10 0.00
Snack 2 175 3.1 1.08 0.00 -0.11
Transportation 241 3.2 1.13 -0.02 -0.08
First aid 216 3.3 1.10 0.15 0.01
Child care 31 2.8 1.44 -0.24 -0.35
Loans 26 3.6 0.90 -0.05 -0.11
Bathrooms 386 2.9 1.27 -0.05 -0.2633
Table 8a
Relative Impact of Independent Variables on Cleaner Piece Rates
Independent variable Gross piece rates
paid by firm








TAX (1 = pay taxes; 0 = do not pay taxes) 2.0 0
MOTHEM 1.9 0
FRINGE 0 -2.6
MAGE (net effect considering quadratic) 0.8 0
MTENURE (net effect considering quadratic) 0.7 0.6
MEXPERT (net effect considering quadratic) -0.6 0
Table 8b
Relative Impact of Independent Variables on Packer Piece Rates
Independent variable Gross piece rates
paid by firm








MAGE (net effect considering quadratic) 0  1.6
MMARST 1.5 1.1
TAX (1 = pay taxes; 0 = do not pay taxes) 1.3 1.1
FRINGE -1.4 -1.0
MSCH (net effect considering quadratic) 0  1.0
MCOND 1.4 1.0
MAXBOX 1.6 0.9
MTENURE (net effect considering quadratic) 0 0.734
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